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Abstract Research has shown that cognitive processes like
the attribution of hostile intention or angry emotion to others
contribute to the development and maintenance of conduct
problems. However, the role of memory has been under-
studied in comparison with attribution biases. The aim of
this study was thus to test if a memory bias for angry faces
was related to conduct problems in youth. Adolescents from
a junior secondary school were presented with angry and
happy faces and were later asked to recognize the same
faces with a neutral expression. They also completed an im-
pulsivity questionnaire. A teacher assessed their behavior.
The results showed that a better recognition of angry faces
than happy faces predicted conduct problems and hyperac-
tivity/inattention as reported by the teacher. The memory
bias effect was more pronounced for impulsive adolescents.
It is suggested that a memory bias for angry faces favors dis-
ruptive behavior but that a good ability to control impulses
may moderate the negative impact of this bias.
Keywords Problematic behavior . Adolescence . Memory
bias . Emotional faces . Impulsivity . Social information
processing
Research in cognitive psychopathology has highlighted
deficits and biases in relationship with the development and
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maintenance of conduct problems. More particularly, it has
been found that aggressive youths recall fewer cues that are
relevant to a social situation (Lochman & Dodge, 1994),
request less information before judging a social situation
(Dodge & Newman, 1981), and generate fewer solutions
to interpersonal problems (Slaby & Guerra, 1988). In addi-
tion to these cognitive deficits, numerous studies have re-
ported cognitive biases in youths with conduct problems.
For instance, aggressive children and adolescents are prone
to attributing hostile intentions to peers whose behavior is
ambiguous, and a meta-analysis suggests that this attribu-
tion bias is a robust finding (Orobio-de Castro, Veerman,
Koops, Bosch, & Monshouwer, 2002). More recent stud-
ies have shown that aggressive children also attribute angry
emotions to others (Schultz, Izard, & Bear, 2004). In addi-
tion to these attribution biases, attentional biases have also
been associated with aggressive behavior. Among children,
Gouze (1987) reported that aggressive boys paid more atten-
tion to aggressive than to cooperative interactions (however
for conflicting results, see Schippell, Vasey, Cravens-Brown,
& Bretveld, 2003).
Some of these empirical findings have been integrated by
Crick and Dodge (1994) in an influential model of aggressive
behavior. In this model, when an individual enters a social
situation, information is processed in five steps before an ac-
tion is taken: (1) encoding of cues, (2) interpretation of cues,
(3) clarification of goals, (4) response access or construction,
and (5) response decision. At each step, information may be
encoded into, and retrieved from, one’s cognitive database
or memory storage. This database contains scripts, schemas,
and social knowledge that guide the processing of informa-
tion and increase its efficiency. However, knowledge stored
in memory can also bias social information processing and
result in social maladjustment. Indeed, it has been found that
a negative conception of others or a poor understanding of
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emotion is related to hostile attribution bias and to aggressive
behavior in children (e.g., Dodge, Laird, Lochman, Zeli, &
Conduct Problems Prevention Research Group, 2002). Be-
cause knowledge stored in memory is considered to guide
the processing of social information in Crick and Dodge’s
(1994) model, one can make the hypothesis that the encod-
ing of information in memory and its subsequent retrieval
are also biased in aggressive children and adolescents, as are
other social information processes such as the attribution of
intention or the allocation of attention. For instance, a nega-
tive conception of the social world could favor the encoding
of hostile information such as insults or anger expressed
by others (step 1 of the model). Subsequently, a developing
tendency to retrieve hostile information could favor a nega-
tive interpretation of new social situations (step 2), promote
aggressive goals (step 3), favor the construction of aggres-
sive responses (step 4), and increase the probability of an
antisocial decision (step 5).
Three studies have assessed the recall of hostile infor-
mation in aggressive children. Dodge and Newman (1981)
asked boys to listen to a story about another boy who might
have committed a hostile act and then to gather information
that could help them to decide whether the boy actually com-
mitted the act. For example, one story concerned an incident
in which “an eldery woman called a school to complain that
on the previous day, a student had deliberately spilled her
groceries and then had run away” (p. 376). After the par-
ticipant heard the story, he was told that he could listen to
audiotape testimonies that would help him to decide whether
the suspect had committed the act. Testimonies consisted of
sentences that either favored or rejected the possibility of a
hostile act (supporting and nonsupporting statements). An
example of a supporting statement for the previous story is
“I saw him running in the direction of that woman’s house
yesterday after school” (p. 376). The results revealed no
significant difference between the groups of aggressive and
nonaggressive boys with regard to the proportion of support-
ing acts recalled. In a second study, aggressive and nonag-
gressive boys were shown the video of an interview. In this
interview, an adult asked a boy to describe things that he did
with kids in his classroom. The boy made hostile, neutral,
and benevolent statements (Dodge & Frame, 1982). An ex-
ample of hostile statement is “This morning I kicked a boy
named Joshua because he is ugly” (p. 625). Following the
presentation of the interview, the participant was asked to
recall as much as possible of what the boy in the video had
said. Instances of correct recall of benevolent acts, neutral
acts and hostile acts were counted. Nonsignificant differ-
ences were found between the groups in terms of the mem-
orization of hostile information. In a third study, Milich and
Dodge (1984) used both the testimony and interview tasks
to compare groups of boys with and without aggressive be-
havior. Here again, non-significant differences were found
between the groups in terms of the memorization of hostile
information. Thus, none of these studies highlighted statisti-
cally significant results when aggressive and nonaggressive
boys were compared. However methodological issues might
explain this absence of significant differences. Firstly, the use
of verbal statements is problematic for the study of conduct
problems because these later are often associated with verbal
difficulties (Teichner & Golden, 2000). Secondly, it should
be noted that in the testimony task, participants memorized
statements supporting a hostile act, but the statement itself
did not necessarily depict a hostile action (e.g., running in the
direction of a woman’s house is not a hostile action by itself).
Thirdly, in the three studies, aggressive and control groups
were formed by dichotomizing continuous variables (median
split or extreme scores). This practice has various negative
consequences, including the loss of information, power, and
effect size (MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002).
As a consequence, it might be premature to conclude that
conduct problems are not related to a memory bias for hos-
tile information.
To overcome the limitations of previous studies, we used a
memory task with emotional faces. Faces have the advantage
of being visual stimuli, and performance at the task should
depend less on verbal difficulties that are known to correlate
with conduct problems. In addition, they are highly signifi-
cant social stimuli. Indeed, of all the information available in
a social situation, faces and emotional expressions are prob-
ably the most salient and important cues when one engages
in social interaction (Bruce & Young, 1986). During the en-
coding phase of the task, faces were presented with a happy
or an angry expression. During the recognition phase, which
took place five minutes later, the same faces were presented
among new ones but all faces had a neutral expression. After
seeing each face, the participant had to indicate whether it had
been presented before. If the face was recognized, the partici-
pant had to remember whether its initial expression had been
angry or happy. In our study, the recognition of faces’ iden-
tity was separated from the recall of facial expressions. This
procedure has several advantages. Firstly, current models of
face processing generally assume that identity recognition
and expression recognition involve independent processes.
Secondly, it is probably a more ecological procedure because
people generally express anger or happiness for only a short
time (Bruce & Young, 1986).
In order to assess adolescent behavior, a teacher com-
pleted the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ,
Goodman, 1997). This scale allows the evaluation of four
types of problematic behavior: Conduct problems, Hyperac-
tivity/Inattention, Emotional symptoms and Peer problems.
The fifth dimension of the scale evaluates prosocial behavior.
It should be noted that the Conduct problems subscale
of the SDQ covers various types of antisocial behavior,
including aggressive behavior, displays of anger, and
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oppositional behavior. The literature on social information
processing has highlighted a hostile attribution bias in
children with aggressive behavior, but also among children
with oppositional defiant disorder (Webster-Stratton &
Lindsay, 1999). Because Conduct problems in the SDQ
cover both aggressive behavior and oppositional behavior,
we hypothesized that a higher score on this subscale would
be related to a memory bias for angry faces.
Several years of research in the field of personality have
highlighted impulsivity as an important predictor of conduct
problems in adolescence (e.g., Luengo, Carrillo-de la-Pena,
Otero, & Romero, 1994). In addition, impulsivity seems to
play an important role in the processing of social information.
Dodge and Newman (1981) observed that aggressive boys
responded faster and with less attention to available social
cues than nonaggressive boys. Their results also showed that
aggressive boys overattributed hostility to peers only when
they responded quickly. Overall, these results suggest that
the hostile attribution bias in aggressive children increases
with their level of impulsivity. In adolescence, Colder and
Stice (1998) have shown that trait anger is related to more
delinquency and that this relationship is stronger for individ-
uals with high impulsivity scores. These authors proposed
that impulsive adolescents who frequently experience anger
are more likely to act antisocially because they do not reflect
on the consequences of their behavior. Thus, the effect of
anger on social adjustment may be potentiated by impulsiv-
ity. Similarly, a memory bias for hostile information may
have a greater impact on behavior among adolescents with
a high level of impulsivity. With this in mind, the question
arises whether impulsivity acts as a moderating variable on
the hypothesized relationship between a memory bias for
angry faces and conduct problems.
However, it should be noted that impulsivity is a heteroge-
neous concept (Gerbing, Ahadi, & Patton, 1987). In a recent
effort to clarify this concept, Whiteside and Lynam (2001)
developed the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale, which has
the advantage of being derived from previous impulsivity
scales. The UPPS assesses four traits of impulsivity. The
first trait, Urgency, “refers to the tendency to experience
strong impulses, frequently under conditions of negative af-
fect” (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001: 685). The second trait,
Premeditation, “refers to the tendency to think and reflect
on the consequences of an act before engaging in that act”
(p. 685). The third trait, Perseverance, “refers to an individ-
ual’s ability to remain focused on a task that may be boring or
difficult” (p. 685) Finally, Sensation seeking “incorporates
two aspects: 1) a tendency to enjoy and pursue activities that
are exciting and 2) an openness to trying new experiences that
may or may not be dangerous” (p. 686). The different facets
of impulsivity appear to be related to specific problems in
adolescence. Lack of premeditation has been found to be the
aspect of impulsivity that best predicts adolescent conduct
problems reported by teachers with the SDQ (d’Acremont,
2005). Premeditation in the UPPS impulsive behavior scale
seems to reflect an ability to take the consequences of an ac-
tion into account (Zermatten, Van der Linden, d’Acremont,
Jermann, & Bechara, 2005) and it could incite adolescents
to avoid antisocial actions that are followed sooner or later
by negative consequences (e.g., legal sanctions). Lack of
Perseverance has been found to be the aspect of impulsiv-
ity that best predicts Hyperactivity/Inattention (d’Acremont,
2005). This later result suggests that attentional processes
are involved in the Perseverance facet of impulsivity. Fur-
ther research is needed to identify the cognitive processes
involved in the various facets of impulsivity. However, the
ability to evaluate the consequences of an action (Premedita-
tion) and the ability to control one’s attention (Perseverance)
may both help adolescents to reduce the negative impact of
biased memories.
To sum up, one major contribution of previous research on
conduct problems in youth has been to show how cognitive
factors contribute to their etiology and maintenance. Encod-
ing, attentional, and memory retrieval processes, however,
have been understudied in comparison with attributional pro-
cesses. A few studies have explored the memorization of
hostile information but their results revealed no statistically
significant bias in aggressive children. The absence of sig-
nificant results may be explained by methodological limita-
tions, mainly the use of verbal statements that are not clearly
hostile and the dichotomization of continuous variables to
form aggressive and control groups. To overcome these lim-
itations, we used a memory task with angry and happy faces,
which are highly relevant social stimuli. In addition, conduct
problems was treated as a continuous variable to avoid the
loss of information, power, and effect size. We also included
an assessment of impulsivity because according to previous
studies, social information processing bias seems to be more
pronounced in impulsive children. Our main prediction was
that in a community sample of adolescents, conduct prob-
lems would be related to a better memorization of angry
faces. We also made the hypothesis that the memory bias
effect would be moderated by impulsivity.
Method
Participants
The participants were students from a public junior sec-
ondary school located in Geneva, a city in the French-
speaking part of Switzerland. The school was selected by
the Geneva administration that authorizes research projects
in schools. To balance the sample, two classes were selected
from the seventh grade, two from the eighth grade, and two
from the ninth grade. There were 110 students in the six
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classes. Their parents were informed by mail about the study
and their authorization was requested. The teenagers were
free to choose whether to participate in the research and no
compensation for participation was given. Ninetyfive stu-
dents received authorization from their parents and chose
to participate to the study. The students completed the face
memory task collectively with their classes. Each student’s
teacher completed the SDQ for him or her.
Adolescents whom their teachers had known for less than
6 months were not included in the analysis. To reduce the
risk of misunderstanding items of the UPPS Scale, non-
native speakers of French who had spoken the language for
less than 5 years were not included. The validation studies
of the French SDQ and UPPS indicated that the reliability of
their subscales ranged from “acceptable” to “very good” (see
below for the psychometric properties of the questionnaires).
It was therefore reasonable to replace a missing value by the
mean of the subscale that the particular missing value be-
longed to (Schafer & Graham, 2002: 158). The final sample
was made up of 86 students (36 girls and 50 boys) aged from
13 to 17 years old (M = 14.31, SD = 0.99). Seventy-four
students were citizens of European countries (including 43
Swiss citizens), 7 of African countries, 3 of Asian countries,
1 of Haiti, and 1 of Russia. Sixty-three were native French
speakers, and the others had spoken French for a mean of
8.96 years (SD = 2.99).
UPPS impulsive behavior scale (UPPS, Whiteside &
Lynam, 2001)
The UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale is an English ques-
tionnaire intended to assess four impulsivity traits: Urgency,
lack of Premeditation, lack of Perseverance, and Sensation
seeking. Answers are given on a Likert scale ranging from
“Disagree strongly” (1) to “Agree strongly” (4). The scale
was developed with American undergraduate students
(Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). It was adapted to French
using a back-translation method and the four dimensions of
impulsivity were confirmed in a sample of undergraduates
(Van der Linden et al., 2006). It was then validated in a
community sample of French-speaking adolescents that
included the secondary school students in the present
study (d’Acremont & Van der Linden, 2005). In this latter
study, the four-factor model of impulsivity was confirmed
separately for boys (n = 314), girls (n = 314), and the
whole sample by means of structural equation modeling.
For the whole sample, the fit indices were SRMR = 0.068
and RMSEA = 0.051, which corresponded to an acceptable
model (Schermelleh-Engel & Moosbrugger, 2003). Internal
reliability was .81 for Urgency (12 items), .82 for Premed-
itation (11 items), .83 for Perseverance (10 items), and .84
for Sensation seeking (12 items). Thus, the UPPS subscales
appeared to have very good internal reliability (>.80).
Strengths and difficulties questionnaire (SDQ, Goodman,
1997)
The SDQ is an English questionnaire intended to assess child
and adolescent behavior (Goodman, 1997). The informant-
rated version of the questionnaire was used here. Answers
are given on a 3-point Likert scale: “Not true” (0), “Some-
what true” (1), and “Certainly true” (2). The English scale
has been validated among community samples of children
and adolescents (Goodman, 2001) and makes a distinction
between five types of behavior: (1) Conduct problems, with
items assessing temper tantrums, disobedience, fighting or
bullying, lying or cheating, and stealing; (2) Hyperactiv-
ity/Inattention, with items assessing restlessness, fidgeting
or squirming, distraction or mind-wandering, absence of de-
liberation, and lack of perseverance; (3) Peer problems, with
items assessing social isolation, lack of friendship, low pop-
ularity among peers, victimization, and relationships with
adults rather than peers; (4) Emotional symptoms, with items
assessing physical symptom complaints, worries, unhappi-
ness, nervousness and fear; and (5) Prosocial behavior with
items assessing consideration for others, sharing, helpful at-
titude, and kindness. The scale was translated into French
using a backtranslation procedure (Fombonne et al., 2005).
It was then validated in a community sample of French-
speaking adolescents that included the secondary school stu-
dents of the present study (d’Acremont & Van der Linden,
2006). The five-factor organization of the SDQ was con-
firmed separately for boys (n = 226), girls (n = 226), and
the whole sample by means of structural equation modeling.
For the whole sample, the fit indices were SRMR = 0.085
and RMSEA = 0.058, which corresponded to an accept-
able model. Internal reliability was .75 for Conduct prob-
lems (5 items), .84 for Hyperactivity/Inattention (5 items),
.62 for Peer problems (5 items), .76 for Emotional symptoms
(5 items), and .89 for Prosocial behavior (5 items). Thus, the
SDQ subscales appeared to have good to very good internal
reliability (>.70 and >.80), except for Peer problems which
had an acceptable internal reliability (>.60).
Emotional face memory task
The procedure for the memory task was adapted from
D’Argembeau, Van der Linden, Etienne, and Comblain
(2003). Colored pictures of 24 faces, each displaying a neu-
tral, a happy, and an angry expression, were used. These
faces were selected from the Karolinska Directed Emotional
Faces set (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Ohman, 1998). Stimuli with
unusual features (e.g., beards, glasses) were not used. Three
sets (Sets 1, 2, and 3) of eight pictures (four males and four
females) were used. Series of 16 faces were built by combin-
ing two sets (Series 12, 13, and 23). The order of presentation
in each series was randomized. Then two versions (Versions
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A and B) were made of each series. In version A, eight faces
expressed anger (four males and four females) and eight
faces expressed happiness (four males and four females). In
version B, the facial expressions were reversed. A different
combination (combinations 12A, 12B, 13A, 13B, 23A, and
23B) was used for each of the six classes selected in the
school (e.g., combination 12A is version A of series 12).
During the recognition phase, the three sets of faces (sets
1, 2, and 3) were combined to build a series of 24 neutral
faces.
The task was programmed with E-prime to ensure accu-
rate presentation times. During the encoding phase, faces
were displayed one by one with a stimulus onset asynchrony
of 5,500 ms. Each face was displayed for 5,000 ms followed
by a blank screen for 500 ms. In the recognition phase, faces
were displayed with a question and two answer buttons at
the bottom of the screen. The first question was “Is this a
person you have seen before?” and the answer buttons were
“Yes” and “No.” If the participant answered “Yes” with the
mouse, the question was replaced by “Did this face have a
joyful expression or an angry expression when you saw it
before?”
A countdown started at the end of the encoding phase
and the recognition phase started automatically after 5 min.
Meanwhile, the adolescents filled in a general information
questionnaire (gender, date of birth, etc.). The instructions
indicated that faces would be displayed and the participants
would have to recognize them again 5 min later. The in-
structions did not mention that the faces would display any
emotion. Thus, the encoding of emotional information is
considered to be implicit.
Statistical analysis
The acceptance or rejection of a hypothesis based on p-
value alone has been shown to be problematic, mainly be-
cause p-values do not distinguish effect size from sample
size (Schmidt, 1996). We followed the recommendation of
the Task Force on Statistical inference (Wilkinson, 1999)
and calculated effect sizes within 95% Confidence Intervals
(CI). To estimate relationships between variables, we used
Pearson’s correlations (r). To estimate differences between
groups, we used effect size correlations (reffect size), an esti-
mator developed by Rosenthal, Rosnow, and Rubin (2000).
The advantage of this correlation approach is that all effect
sizes are given on the same scale (from − 1 to 1). According
to Cohen (1988), correlation of between .10 and .30 (abso-
lute value) corresponds to a small effect, between .30 and
.50 to a moderate effect, and above .50 to a large effect. A
correlation <.10 (absolute value) is considered to be negli-
gible. Estimates are marked with an asterisk (∗) if the 0 was
not included in their 95% CI.
Assessing performance on a memory test by means of
correctly detected old items (hits) is problematic because a
participant who answers “old” to all old and new items will
get the best score. Consequently, it is necessary to rely on
signal detection theory and to calculate discrimination (d’)
and response bias (C). Discrimination is a better measure of
memory performance because it is not confounded with the
propensity to respond to all stimuli, that is, the response bias.
Following the advice of Lockhart and Murdock (1970), we
selected C rather than beta to measure the response bias. To
do a signal detection analysis, both a target (e.g., old faces)
and a response to the target (e.g., pressing the space bar) need
to be defined. A hit is defined as a response to a target and
a false alarm as a response to a nontarget (distractor). d’ is
a function of the difference between the number of hits and
false alarms. For a subject who responds to all targets and
distractors, this difference is null and that person’s perfor-
mance is poor. More generally, d’ = 0 indicates an inability
to discriminate targets from distractors. C = 0 indicates the
absence of response bias.
For the recognition of faces, a signal detection analysis
was performed on “old” and “new” responses (Snodgrass &
Corwin, 1988). Old faces were defined as the targets. A high
d’ indicates a better ability to recognize old faces (d’Face).
A high C corresponds to a “conservative” attitude, that is,
the participant is reluctant to answer “old” (CFace). Then a
similar signal detection analysis was performed, but only on
responses to old angry versus new faces. A high d’ indicates a
better ability to recognize angry faces (d’Angry Face). Another
analysis was performed on responses to old happy versus new
faces. A high d’ corresponds to a better ability to recognize
happy faces (d’Happy Face). A face recognition bias (d’Face Bias)
was assessed by the function d’Angry Face − d’Happy Face. Thus,
a positive value indicates a better recognition of angry faces
than happy faces. For the recall of facial expression, the
signal detection analysis was performed on “angry” and
“happy” responses, but only when the participant correctly
recognized an old face. Angry expressions were defined as
the target. A high d’ indicates a better ability to discriminate
“angry” and “happy” expressions (d’Expression). A response
bias (CExpression) was also calculated. A high C indicates a
“conservative” attitude, that is, the participant is reluctant to
answer “angry.” One can define a memory bias as the ten-
dency to memorize one given category of information better
than another one. Based on this definition, it is important
to note that the recognition bias (d’Face Bias) corresponds
to a memory bias but that the response bias for expression
doesn’t (CExpression). Details on the formulas and proofs used
for the signal detection theory are available from the first
author. All analyses were computed with R (R Development
Core Team, 2006).
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Table 1 Comparison of Swiss (n = 86) and British (n = 3407) samples on the SDQ
SDQ subscales Swiss Mean (SD) British Mean (SD) reffect size (95% CI)
1. Conduct problems 1.36 (1.83) 0.9 (1.7) .04∗(.01 .07)
2. Hyper./Inatt. 3.29 (2.89) 2.6 (2.7) .04∗(.01 .07)
3. Peer problems 1.86 (2.12) 1.4 (1.8) .04∗(.01 .07)
4. Emotional symptoms 1.78 (2.31) 1.3 (1.9) .04∗(.01 .07)
5. Prosocial behavior 6.32 (2.97) 7.1 (2.4) −.05∗(−.02 − .08)
Note. Hyper./Inatt. = Hyperactivity/Inattention. Data from the British sample are taken from Meltzer, Gatward,
Goodman, & Ford (2000).
∗0 not included in the 95% confidence interval.
Results
Strengths and difficulties questionnaire
Means and SDs of the SDQ are presented in Table 1. These
results were compared to the teacher SDQ norms reported for
a British national survey of 3,407 adolescents aged from 11 to
15 years old (Meltzer, Gatward, Goodman, & Ford, 2000).
The mean difference between the Swiss and British sam-
ples for Conduct problems was significant but corresponded
to a negligible effect, reffect size = .04∗ (see equations 2.3
and 2.20 in Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000). The mean
difference for Hyperactivity/Inattention was also negligible,
reffect size = .04∗. This was also the case for Peer problems,
reffect size = .04∗, Emotional symptoms, reffect size = .04∗, and
Prosocial behavior, reffect size = − .05∗. Thus, even though
means for problematic behavior are significantly higher in
the Swiss sample than in the British one and the mean for
prosocial behavior is lower, these differences are negligible
in terms of effect size. In sum, we can consider that the
observed behavior in the Swiss sample fell in the normal
range.
Correlations between subscales showed that Conduct
problems and Hyperactivity/Inattention were highly cor-
related, r = .77∗. The correlation between Emotional
symptoms and Peer problems was large, r = .55∗. Con-
duct problems and Hyperactivity/Inattention were nega-
tively related to Peer problems and Emotional symptoms,
with small correlations (see Table 2). Prosocial behav-
ior was mainly opposed to Conduct problems and Hyper-
activity/Inattention with large negative correlations. Con-
duct problems, Hyperactivity/Inattention, and Peer problems
were more frequent among older adolescents, r = .26∗,
CI = (.05, .45), r = .27∗, CI = (.07, .46), and r = .22∗,
CI = (.01, .41), respectively. These age effects were small in
magnitude.
Emotional face memory task
The probability (P) of responding “old” to an old face was
P(“hit”) = .61. The probability of responding “old” to a
new face was P(“false-alarm”) = .18. The probability of
responding “angry” to an old angry face was P(“hit”) = .66.
The probability of responding “angry” to an old happy face
was P(“false-alarm”) = .36. A signal detection analysis
was computed for the recognition of faces and the recall
of expressions. Means and SDs are presented in Table 3.
Adolescents were generally able to discriminate between
old and new faces, as indicated by the positive d’ value,
d’Face = 1.17∗, CI = (1.04, 1.30). They had a rather conser-
vative attitude, that is, participants were generally reluctant
to answer “old” when a face was presented, as indicated by
the positive response bias index, CFace = 0.31∗, CI = (0.23,
0.38). Happy faces were better memorized than angry faces,
as indicated by the negative value of the bias, d’Face Bias,
M = − 0.24∗, CI = ( − 0.39, − 0.09). Participants were
also able to discriminate “angry” from “happy” expressions,
d’Expression = 0.68∗, CI = (0.51, 0.84). The signal detection
analysis also indicated that there was no response bias for
expression, CExpression, M = 0.00, CI = ( − 0.07, 0.07).
Table 2 Correlation between the SDQ subscales (95% CI)
SDQ subscales 1 2 3 4 5
1. Conduct problems — — — — —
2. Hyper./Inatt. .77∗(.67 .84) — — — —
3. Peer problems −.18 (−.38 .03) − .18 ( − .38 .03) — — —
4. Emotional symptoms −.23∗(−.42 − .02) − .12 ( − .32 .10) .55∗(.39 .68) — —
5. Prosocial behavior −.56∗(−.69 − .40) − .61∗ ( − .72 − .45) −.14 (−.34 .07) − .00 ( − .22 .21) —
Note. Hyper./Inatt. = Hyperactivity/Inattention.
∗0 not included in the 95% confidence interval.
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Table 3 Means (SD) for the signal detection analysis
Signal indices Mean SD
Face recognition
d’Face 1.17∗ 0.62
CFace 0.31∗ 0.35
d’Angry Face 1.05∗ 0.78
d’Happy Face 1.29∗ 0.63
d’Face Bias −0.24∗ 0.68
Expression recall
d’Expression 0.68∗ 0.78
CExpression 0.00 0.32
Note. d’Face = recognition for faces, CFace = response bias for faces,
d’Angry Face = recognition for angry faces, d’Happy Face = recognition
for happy faces, d’Face Bias = recognition bias for angry faces,
d’Expression = discrimination between angry and happy expressions,
CExpression = response bias for expressions.
∗ 0 not included in the 95% confidence interval.
The ability to recognize old faces (d’Face) decreased with
age, r = − .25∗, CI = ( − .44, − .04). Further analysis
indicated that this developmental trend was due to an in-
crease in false alarms with age. It was also found that older
adolescents respond faster. Overall, these results suggest that
older adolescents are more “impulsive” when they are asked
to recognize faces. However, there was no significant correla-
tion between age and the ability to discriminate expressions
(d’Expression). Age also had no significant effects on the recog-
nition bias (d’Face Bias) or the response bias for expressions
(CExpression).
Correlations between behavior and memory
for emotional faces
The results for the recognition of faces are presented in
Table 4. Correlations indicated that Conduct problems were
significantly related to a memory bias for angry faces,
r = .23∗. This bias was mainly due to a better ability to rec-
ognize angry faces. Indeed, Conduct problems had a small
positive correlation with the discrimination of angry faces
(d’Angry Face), r = .16, and a negligible negative correla-
tion with the discrimination of happy faces (d’Happy Face),
r = − .04. Hyperactivity/Inattention was significantly re-
lated to a memory bias for angry faces, r = .23∗. As with
Conduct problems, this bias was mainly due to a small
positive correlation with the discrimination of angry faces
(d’Angry Face), r = .19, and a negligible negative correla-
tion with the discrimination of happy faces (d’Happy Face),
r = − .01. The Peer problems factor was related to a mem-
ory bias against angry faces, r = − .22∗. The memory bias
was due to a moderate negative correlation with the discrim-
ination of angry faces, r = − .34∗, and a small negative cor-
relation with the discrimination of happy faces, r = − .18.
Peer problems were also significantly related to a reduced
ability to recognize old faces (d’Face), r = − .31∗. Emo-
tional symptoms were significantly related to a memory bias
against angry faces, r = − .35∗. This bias was due to a
small and negative correlation with the discrimination of an-
gry faces, r = − .28∗, and a negligible positive correlation
with the discrimination of happy faces, r = .03. Prosocial
behavior was not significantly related to a recognition bias,
r = .01. In sum, the effect size of the recognition bias was
small for Conduct problems, Hyperactivity/Inattention and
Peer problems, and moderate for Emotional symptoms.
The results for the recall of facial expressions are pre-
sented in Table 5. Correlations between adolescents’ be-
havior and the ability to discriminate angry expressions
(d’Expression) or the response bias (CExpression) were non-
significant. It therefore seems that adolescents with prob-
lematic behavior do not have any difficulty remembering the
expressions on faces they recognize correctly and that their
responses are not biased.
Moderating effect of impulsivity
For all regressions, predictors were entered simultaneously
because we were interested in assessing the relative impor-
tance of predictors rather than testing different models by
selecting predictors (see Howell, 1998: 601–613). The mem-
ory bias regressed on the four facets of impulsivity, sex, and
age revealed no significant result. This suggests that impul-
sivity has no main effect on the memory bias for angry faces.
Regressions were then computed to test whether impulsivity
Table 4 Correlation between the recognition of emotional faces and behavior (95% CI)
SDQ subscales d’Face Bias d’Angry Face d’Happy Face d’Face CFace
Conduct problems .23∗(.01 .42) .16 (−.05 .36) −.04 (−.25 .17) .07 (−.14 .28) −.10 (−.31 .11)
Hyper./Inatt. .23∗(.02 .42) .19 (−.02 .39) −.01 (−.22 .20) .11 (−.10 .32) −.11 (−.32 .10)
Peer problems −.22∗(−.41 − .01) −.34∗(−.52 − .14) −.18 (−.38 .03) −.31∗(−.49 − .11) −.19 (−.38 .03)
Emotional symptoms −.35∗(−.52 − .15) −.28∗(−.47 − .07) .03 (−.18 .24) −.17 (−.37 .05) −.04 (−.25 .18)
Prosocial behavior .01 (−.20 .23) .07 (−.14 .28) .08 (−.14 .28) .09 (−.12 .30) .17 (−.05 .37)
Note. d’Face Bias = recognition bias for angry faces, d’Angry Face = recognition for angry faces, d’Happy Face = recognition for happy faces,
d’Face = recognition for faces, CFace = response bias for faces.
∗0 not included in the 95% confidence interval.
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Table 5 Correlation between the recall of emotional expressions
and behavior (95% CI)
SDQ subscales d’Expression CExpression
Conduct problems .14 (−.07 .34) .14 (−.08 .34)
Hyper./Inatt. .01 (−.20 .22) .15 (−.06 .35)
Peer problems .12 (−.09 .33) .07 (−.14 .28)
Emotional symptoms .14 (−.07 .34) −.01 (−.23 .20)
Prosocial behavior −.07 (−.28 .14) −.15 (−.35 .06)
Note. d’Expression = discrimination between angry and happy expres-
sions, CExpression = response bias for expressions.
∗ 0 not included in the 95% confidence interval.
did moderate the link between the recognition bias for angry
faces and problematic behavior. Similar results were found
when Conduct problems or Hyperactivity/Inattention was
used as the criterion. To reduce the number of tables, results
are presented for the sum of Conduct problems and Hyper-
activity/Inattention. This sum can be considered as reflecting
disruptive behavior. Disruptive behavior was regressed on
the recognition bias, the four dimensions of impulsivity and
their interactions with the bias. Gender and age were also
entered as predictors. Gender was set to 0 for girls, and 1 for
boys. Other predictors and the criteria were standardized in
order to allow the interpretation of interaction effects (Aiken
& West, 1991). The results of a least square regression
revealed 3 extreme residuals (>2∗SD). To reduce their influ-
ence on the estimation, the regression was computed again
with a robust estimator (M estimator, Venables, & Ripley,
2002: 158). The results revealed a significant effect of the
bias, beta = 0.29∗, CI = (0.08, 0.50), the bias × lack of
Perseverance interaction, beta = 0.48∗, CI = (0.15, 0.80),
and age, beta = 0.19∗, CI = (0.01, 0.38) (Table 6). These
results indicated firstly that the effect of the recognition bias
on disruptive behavior remained when impulsivity, gender,
and age were taken into account. Secondly, the effect
of the recognition bias on disruptive behavior was more
pronounced for adolescents with a lack of Perseverance.
When Peer problems or Emotional symptoms were used
as criteria, there was no significant interaction between the
bias for angry faces and the four facets of impulsivity, but
the significant effect of the recognition bias remained.
In order to decompose the interaction effect, a model
with only the memory bias as predictor and the lack of Per-
severance as moderator was computed in order to predict
disruptive behavior (Aiken & West, 1991). The model was
estimated for a low ( − 1 SD), average (0), and high ( + 1 SD)
level of lack of Perseverance. In this model, the effect of the
lack of Perseverance was beta = 0.15, CI = ( − 0.02, 0.33)
and the interaction effect was beta = 0.34∗, CI = (0.18,
0.50). For the low level of lack of Perseverance, the memory
bias effect was beta = − 0.02, CI = ( − 0.24, 0.21). For
the average level, the effect was 0.32∗, CI = (0.14, 0.50).
Table 6 Disruptive behavior regressed on memory bias, impulsivity,
gender and age
Variable Beta SE t p
(Intercept) −0.29 0.16 — —
Bias 0.29∗ 0.10 2.78 .01
Urg. 0.16 0.10 1.61 .11
L. Prem. 0.15 0.12 1.21 .23
L. Pers. −0.00 0.13 −0.04 .97
Sens. Seek. −0.05 0.12 −0.39 .70
Bias × Urg. 0.07 0.12 0.59 .56
Bias × L. Prem. −0.21 0.12 −1.67 .10
Bias × L. Pers. 0.48∗ 0.16 2.92 .00
Bias × Sens. Seek. 0.03 0.09 0.35 .73
Sex 0.21 0.21 1.01 .31
Age 0.19∗ 0.09 2.08 .04
Note. Disruptive behavior = Conduct problem + Hyperactivity/
Inattention. Urg. = Urgency, L. Prem. = Lack of Premeditation, L.
Pers. = Lack of Perseverance, Sens. Seek. = Sensation seeking.
∗0 not included in the 95% confidence interval.
For the high level (impulsive adolescents), the memory bias
effect was beta = 0.66∗, CI = (0.41, 0.91). It can be con-
cluded that for adolescents who have a good ability to control
their impulses, the memory bias was not related to disruptive
behavior (see Fig. 1).
Discussion
The first objective of this study was to see whether antiso-
cial behavior in adolescents was associated with a memory
bias for hostile information. Supporting the main hypothe-
sis, the results showed that Conduct problems, which cover
antisocial behavior, were related to a memory bias for an-
gry faces. This bias was mainly due to a better recognition
of angry faces. Previous studies have shown that children
with trait anger or antisocial behavior paid more attention
to anger-related information (e.g., Gouze, 1987). We can
therefore make the hypothesis that adolescents with conduct
problems allocate more attention to angry faces during the
encoding phase of the memory task and that this attentional
bias leads to a memory bias. However, the memory bias
could also be due to a better consolidation and/or retrieval of
anger-related information. For instance, in real-world situa-
tions, rumination may be a process by which anger-related
episodes are consolidated in long-term memory (Rusting &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). More generally, the memory bias
for angry faces might be explained by an acquired hostile
schema. Several empirical and theoretical considerations in-
dicate that exposure to community or family violence favors
the formation of a hostile schema that guides social informa-
tion processing, favors attribution bias, and promotes aggres-
sive responses (Dodge, Bates, & Pettit, 1990). Such a hostile
schema could also yield a memory bias for angry faces. An
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important avenue for future research is to test whether a
memory bias for angry faces is correlated to the attribution
of hostile intentions and angry emotions. It would also be
interesting to see whether a memory bias for angry faces is
partly explained by past social experiences and knowledge
stored in memory.
Like Conduct problems, Hyperactivity/Inattention was re-
lated to a memory bias for angry faces, mainly due to the
better recognition of such faces. This result is not surprising
because Conduct problems and Hyperactivity/Inattention are
closely related (d’Acremont & Van der Linden, 2006). Con-
duct disorder (CD) and Attention Deficit/Hyperactive Dis-
order (ADHD) are frequently comorbid and there has been
some debate in the literature as to whether they are really sep-
arate conditions. In addition, CD and ADHD share common
risk factors such as harsh parenting, and the development of
a hostile schema may characterize both disorders (Patterson,
DeGarmo, & Knutson, 2000). Hyperactive/inattentive ado-
lescents also experience more anger in daily life (Whalen,
Jamner, Henker, Delfino, & Lozano, 2002). A hostile schema
or a mood-congruent effect could explain why adolescents
with Hyperactive/Inattention problems showed a memory
bias for angry faces in our study.
Emotional symptoms were related to a memory bias
against angry faces. This bias was mainly due to a reduced
ability to recognize angry faces. Thus Emotional symptoms
and Conduct problems had opposing relationships with the
recognition of angry faces. Research conducted in the field
of cognitive neuroscience might help us to interpret this op-
position. A large body of research has related anger to an
asymmetric functioning of the right and left frontal regions
of the brain (Davidson, 2004). More specifically, it appears
that an asymmetry in favor of the left frontal cortex supports
approach-related emotions like anger while an asymmetry
in favor of the right frontal cortex supports withdrawal-
related emotions like anxiety and sadness (Harmon-Jones
& Allen, 1998; Tutus, Kibar, Sofuoglu, Basturk, & Go¨nu¨l,
1998). Based on this evidence, one can propose the hypoth-
esis that the observed link between Conduct problems and a
memory bias in favor of angry faces reflects approach ten-
dencies and is underlain by greater activity in the left frontal
cortex. Conversely, the link between Emotional symptoms
and a memory bias against angry faces may reflect avoidance
tendencies and be underlain by greater activity in the right
frontal cortex. These suggestions are speculative and should
be explored empirically.
Concerning the other types of problematic behavior, Peer
problems were related to a reduced ability to recognize emo-
tional faces. This memory impairment was due to a poorer
ability to recognize both happy and angry faces. Because
the impairment was more pronounced for angry faces, Peer
problems were also related to a bias against angry faces.
An impaired memory for emotional faces, especially angry
faces, may contribute to social maladjustment. Indeed, if an
individual finds it difficult to recognize angry people, he/she
might be more exposed to negative interactions with peers
because of their unexpected negative reactions. Contrary to
the four types of problematic behavior, Prosocial behavior
was not related to a memory bias for angry or happy faces.
On the whole, the memory bias for angry faces was found to
be specifically related to Conduct problems and Hyperactiv-
ity/Inattention in a community sample of adolescents.
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The second aim of this study was to explore the rela-
tionships between impulsivity, memory for emotional faces,
and problematic behavior in adolescence. We hypothesized
that impulsivity would moderate the effect of a memory
bias for angry faces. Regression analyses firstly showed that
the memory bias for angry faces predicted Conduct prob-
lems and Hyperactivity/Inattention after impulsivity, gen-
der, and age were controlled for. Secondly, the regressions
indicated that one dimension of impulsivity, lack of Per-
severance, moderated the memory bias effect. That is, the
memory bias effect on Conduct problems and Hyperactiv-
ity/Inattention was more pronounced for adolescents with
a lack of Perseverance. Perseverance may reflect resistance
to proactive interference (Bechara & Van der Linden, 2005),
that is, the resistance to memory intrusions from information
that was previously relevant to the task but has since become
irrelevant. Resistance to proactive interference may also be
impaired in persons with hyperactivity and inattention. Sup-
porting this hypothesis, Cornoldi et al. (2001) have shown
that children with hyperactivity and inattention symptoms
experienced a higher number of intrusions during working
memory tasks and concluded that these children were not
capable of suppressing information that initially needed to
be processed. Resistance to proactive interference may help
adolescents to limit the interference of anger-related cogni-
tion during social interaction and thus reduce the effect of a
memory bias.
Perseverance may also depend on sustained attention pro-
cesses, which are involved in the capacity to maintain a
sufficient attentional level in long-duration tasks. It is worth
noting that studies of children have found that an impairment
of sustained attention increases the effect of negative emo-
tionality on social adjustment (Belsky, Friedman, & Hsieh,
2001). It has been proposed that children with good atten-
tional control are able to regulate negative emotions by turn-
ing their attention away from stimuli that generate frustration
and anger (Eisenberg et al., 2000). Similarly, sustained at-
tention could help adolescents to keep on with an ongoing
activity or social interaction and to ignore people or situa-
tions that activate anger-related episodes in memory. In sum,
sustained attention and resistance to proactive interference
may explain why Perseverance moderates the effect of a
memory bias for angry faces during social interaction. In
line with this latter interpretation, we propose that only im-
pulsive adolescents with a memory bias will act upon their
biased representations whereas less impulsive adolescents
will not.
This study has several limitations. First of all, the sam-
ple size was rather small and replication studies with larger
sample sizes are necessary to increase the precision of the es-
timates. To increase the psychometric quality of the behavior
assessment, it would be appropriate to use a multi-informant
method. It should also be noted that the psychometric quali-
ties of the emotional face memory task are as yet unknown.
The reliability and validity of this procedure should be veri-
fied in future studies. The design of our study is correlational.
Consequently, it impossible to decide whether a memory
bias for angry faces causes conduct problems (among other
causes), whether conduct problems cause a memory bias, or
whether their relationship is explained by a third variable, for
instance knowledge stored in memory. In order to find causal
links, longitudinal and experimental designs are needed.
In conclusion, this study showed that conduct problems
and Hyperactivity/Inattention in adolescence are related to a
memory bias for angry faces, mainly due to a better recog-
nition of angry faces. These results are new and suggest that
memory processes for emotional stimuli play an important
role in disruptive behavior during adolescence. The effect
of the memory bias for angry faces was moderated by one
specific aspect of impulsivity: lack of Perseverance. This re-
sult suggests that attentional control can help adolescents to
reduce the influence of anger-related memories.
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